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 ABSTRACT  
 
 
NORTH KOREAN ECONOMIC REFORMS AND THE ROLES OF SOUTH KOREA, 
U.S, CHINA, JAPAN AND RUSSIA 
 
By  
 
HWANG, Tae Wook  
 
 
North Korea is a largely closed society. Through various measures of economic policy, 
North Korea will be able to raise its living standards and greatly improve food security. Six 
years have already passed since North Korea started to reform its economy in order to bring 
about favorable conditions for economic rehabilitation. However, North Korea still does not 
have sufficient conditions for enforcing overall reforms and opening economic policies. That 
is, these reform measures have meanings in the aspect of setting up pre-conditions for 
market-oriented reforms, but it is too early to assess that the economic reform itself is 
propelling the marketization. Therefore, this paper endeavors to analyze North Korean 
economic reforms and examine some ideas for the possible policies in the North Korean 
economy focusing on marketization, export promotion and inducement of foreign capital. 
 
On the other hand, North Korean economic reforms are closely related to the roles of South 
Korea, U.S and other neighboring countries (China, Japan, and Russia). When these 
countries provide a peaceful resolution for supporting North Korean economic reforms, it 
will not only contribute meaningfully to encourage the economic openness of currently 
closed North Korea, but also help improve the degree of stability in the Korean peninsula. 
Hence, this paper examines why neighboring countries should cooperate and what are the 
required roles of neighboring countries for successful North Korean economic reforms. 
I 
 
 Specifically, three things are very important for North Korea to accelerate its economic 
reforms. First, the U.S should ease the economic sanctions against North Korea and stop 
blocking North Korea from joining the international financial institutions such as World 
Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Asian Development Bank. Second, South Korea and 
China should support North Korea to implement its economic reforms continuously through 
their cooperation. Third, U.S and neighboring countries should play the active roles to 
support North Korea to be a normal and equal member of international society by using any 
necessary measures.  
II 
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT .............................................................................................................................. I 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ...................................................................................................... III 
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................. IV 
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................ V 
 
Chapter 1  INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 1 
1. 1 BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................. 1 
1.2. PURPOSE .......................................................................................................................... 4 
1.3. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................... 5 
 
Chapter 2  Analysis of North Korean Economic Reforms ................................................. 5 
2. 1 AN OVERVIEW OF THE NORTH KOREAN ECONOMY ...................................................... 6 
2. 2 THE JULY 1ST ECONOMIC REFORMS ............................................................................... 7 
2. 3 MAIN PROBLEMS OF THE NORTH KOREAN ECONOMIC REFORMS ............................. 10 
2. 4 CURRENT CHALLENGES OF THE NORTH KOREAN ECONOMIC REFORMS .................. 14 
 
Chapter 3 New Economic Policy Directions for Successful Economic Reforms .............. 16 
3. 1 MARKETIZATION ........................................................................................................... 18 
3. 2 EXPORT PROMOTION / INDUCEMENT OF FOREIGN CAPITAL ...................................... 24 
 
Chapter 4  The Required Roles of Neighboring Countries for Supporting North 
Korean Economic Reforms ................................................................................................... 29 
4. 1 THE ROLES OF SOUTH KOREA: SOUTH-NORTH ECONOMIC COOPERATION .............. 30 
4. 2 THE ROLES OF OTHER NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES: U.S, CHINA, JAPAN, RUSSIA ..... 35 
4.2.1 The Roles of the U.S: Further Relief of Economic Sanctions ...................... 35 
4.2.2 The Other Countries: China, Japan, and Russia ......................................... 41 
 
Chapter 5.  Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 46 
 
APPENDICES ........................................................................................................................ 50 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................. 62 
III 
 
 LIST OF TABLES  
 
Table 1 Main Contents of July 1st Economic Reforms in North Korea ........................ 8 
Table 2 The Actual Foreign Trade Records of North Korea ...................................... 18 
Table 3 The List of Key Measures for System Transition .......................................... 20 
Table 4 The Change of North Korea-China Trade ..................................................... 26 
Table 5 The Change of North Korean Won – Dollar Exchange Rate ........................ 27 
Table 6 Official Meetings between South and North Korea ...................................... 34 
Table 7 U.S Trade with North Korea in 2004 – 2007 ................................................. 37 
Table 8 China’s Merchandise Trade with North Korea, 1995-2007 .......................... 42 
Table 9 Japan’s Merchandise Trade with North Korea, 1995-2007 ........................... 44 
 
 
 
 
IV 
 
 V 
 
LIST OF FIGURES  
 
Figure 1 Real Annual Growth in North Korea’s GDP ................................................. 6 
Figure 2 The Official Price System and Making Black-Market in North Korea ....... 21 
Figure 3 The Effect of Increase of Income ................................................................. 23 
Figure 4 Relative Importance of Trade with Major Countries in North Korea .......... 28 
Figure 5 South Korean Merchandise Trade with North Korea .................................. 31 
Figure 6 A Payoff Matrix between South and North Korea ....................................... 32 
 
1 
 
Chapter 1  INTRODUCTION  
 
 
1. 1 Background 
 
North Korea is a unique dynastic and autocratic communist state in the world. The economy 
of North Korea is a centrally planned economy. For example, much of the economy is state 
owned and large amounts of standard statistical data about the economy are still treated as 
state secrets. In particular, as of 2007, North Korea’s economy has remained one of the 
world’s most highly centralized and planned. Moreover, North Korea has become 
increasingly isolated since the early 1990s following the collapse of the former socialist bloc. 
Severe economic difficulty resulted in negative economic growth from 1990 to 1998. For 
instance, the years 1995 to 1997 were named “the period of the arduous march” and the year 
of 1998, “the desperate march for socialism”, reflecting the nation’s desperate economic 
situation. In addition, no country recently has been as notoriously branded as North Korea, 
which has been portrayed as a failed rouge state and a member of an axis of evil proliferating 
nuclear weapons, violating basic human rights, and starving its own people while pursuing an 
unrealistic goal of a strong and prosperous nation (kangsungdaeguk) through the “military-
first” policy. On the basis of this characterization, North Korea has experienced a severe 
famine since 1990s and has not taken any support from the international community. 
 
 Fortunately, North Korean government has encouraged some market-oriented reforms in the 
early years of this decade in the wake of the severe famine that afflicted the country in the 
mid-to late 1990s. 1  Specifically, North Korea launched a number of comprehensive 
economic reforms on July 1st, 2002. An attempt to create Chinese-Style Special Economic 
Zones is representative of North Korea’s movement towards capitalism. Moreover, aiming to 
alleviate its prolonged economic problems, North Korea implemented new economic 
management policies in July 1st of 2002(see Appendix 1). Recently, however, there have 
been signs of some backtracking on reforms by the North Korean leadership as they have 
sought to reassert central control over the economy.2 The reason is because North Korean 
leaders think that the political regime will be able to collapse as they open up its economy 
and reform its economic system. In addition, a necessary prerequisite for the maintenance of 
North Korean political regime has been an effective quarantining from the outside world. As 
a consequence of the government controlling economic policy while pursuing quarantine 
from the outside world, North Korean economy has become increasingly isolated from that 
of the rest of the world. Now, therefore, what is the most needed to North Korea is Kim 
Jung-Il’s “New Thinking” like former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika 
(restructuring). That is, North Korea should resolutely select new policy options good for 
2 
                                            
1 Marcus C. Noland, “The Future of North Korea is South Korea(Or Hope Springs Eternal)”, World 
Economics, 2007 
2 ICG, “North Korea: Can the Iron First Accept the Invisible Hand?”, Brussels: International Crisis Group, 
April, 2005 
 
 economic rehabilitation. 
 
On the other hand, North Korea needs to be assisted by neighboring countries including 
South Korea and U.S in order to accomplish the economic reforms successfully. Of course, 
an essential prerequisite for this is that North Korea abandons the nuclear development and 
ensures denuclearization in the Korean Peninsula. There is no doubt that North Korea’s 
economic rehabilitation would contribute to relieving tension on the Korean peninsula, 
fostering a beneficial economic environment in Northeast Asia. Indeed, the rehabilitation of 
the North Korean economy is now an issue absolutely central to the future security and 
prosperity of Northeast Asia. If so, despite the fact that it is not expected that North Korea 
will, in the near future, undertake radical economic reform and political changes (which 
could include the introduction of a market economy), international communities should 
continue economic support for North Korea to accelerate its economic transition. 3  
Consequently, it is required for South Korea, U.S and other neighboring countries (China, 
Japan, and Russia) to play important roles for North Korean successful economic reforms. 
 
 
3 
                                            
3 Jong-Woon Lee, “North Korea’s Economic Reform Under an International Framework.”, Seoul :KIEP 
Working paper, February, 2002 
 
 1.2. Purpose 
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze North Korean economic reforms and examine new 
policy directions in the North Korean economy for accomplishing successful economic 
reforms. If changes of policy in the North Korean economy are taken into consideration to 
help improve the stability in the Korean peninsula, it will be meaningful to suggest the 
conditions and methods to execute successful economic reforms. Successful economic 
reform here is defined as a policy which can induce North Korea to acquire market 
mechanisms without overturning the regime with minimal downside effect.4 Therefore, this 
paper focuses on investigating the feasible economic policy for North Korea’s successful 
economic reforms. 
 
At the same time, this paper explores the required roles of South Korea, U.S and other 
neighboring countries (China, Japan, and Russia). That is because the issue on North Korean 
economic reforms is closely related to the interests of these countries. That is also because 
the assistance of the international community is necessary in order to achieve North Korean 
economic reforms successfully. 
 
4 
                                            
4 Kim, Young Yoon, “A Study on the reality and prospect of economic reform in North Korea: tasks for 
successful transformation of the North Korea System”, Seoul: Unification Institute, 2007 
 
 1.3. Scope and Methodology 
 
This paper mainly analyzes North Korean economic reforms and presents new policy 
directions in the North Korean economy. Also, this paper examines the required roles of 
South Korea, U.S and neighboring countries. For this, this paper refers to web sites, special 
reports, several research institutions related to North Korean economy, and also important 
countries’ policies on North Korea. In addition, journals, theses, research papers and books 
are also surveyed. Based on those methods and focuses, this paper consists of five chapters. 
Chapter 2 analyzes rough features, main problems and current challenges of North Korean 
economic reforms. Then, Chapter 3 examines which economy policy is the most effective in 
North Korea in order to implement successful economic reforms. In Chapter 4 some 
suggestions are made out the required roles of important countries for North Korea’s 
successful economic reforms. Finally, Chapter 5 provides the overall summary and concludes. 
 
Chapter 2  Analysis of North Korean Economic Reforms 
 
 
North Korean began some economic reforms in order to rehabilitate its economy from July 
1st, 2002. The assessments on these economic reforms are very diverse. From now, this paper 
analyzes the North Korean economy and its economic reforms focusing on main problems 
and current challenges of economic reforms. 
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 2. 1 An Overview of the North Korean Economy 
 
The North Korean economy is one of the world’s most isolated and bleak.5 By standard 
statistical measures, North Korea is the world’s most militarized society, and domestic 
propaganda incessantly proclaims the virtues of “military-first” policies. If comparable 
statistical measures were available for politicization, North Korea might rank first on this 
criterion too. In addition, it can be characterized by state ownership of means of production, 
centralized economic planning and command, and emphasis on military development. The 
economic system is designed to be self-reliant and closed. Currently, North Korea faces a 
dilemma as its economy continues to stagnate. Goods are being unequally distributed, and 
much of the population is suffering from severe privation of basic necessities. Moreover, 
North Korea has been experiencing an ongoing food crisis for more than a decade. Although 
the worst of economic crisis seems to have now passed, the North Korean economy is still 
greatly dependent on foreign assistance (South Korea, China and UN World Food Program) 
to barely escape from starvation. 
Figure 1 Real Annual Growth in North Korea’s GDP 
 
Source : Bank of Korea and Global Insight 
                                            
5 Marcus C.Noland, “Avoiding the Apocalypse: The Future of the Two Koreas”, Institute for International 
Economics, 2000 
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 As shown in Figure 1, growth in estimated real gross domestic product (GDP) in the North 
Korean economy dropped into negative numbers for most of the 1990s before beginning to 
recover in 1999. In 2004 to 2006, growth has been continuing up slightly from earlier years 
at about 2%. In substance, the economy is expanding moderately. However, it is still below 
its 1989 level. 
 
To sum up, the inefficiency of North Korea’s centrally planned economy, especially its 
promotion of state-owned industry, along with high military spending – about 15-25% of 
GDP – pushed the economy into crisis. In addition, North Korean economic difficulties have 
continued up until today. Fortunately, North Korea has initiated some economic reforms that 
include raising wages, allowing prices to better reflect market values, and opening foreign 
trade zones for international investment. However, the North Korean economic reforms 
failed to achieve the anticipated result. 
 
2. 2 The July 1st Economic Reforms 
 
In July 1st (2002), North Korea introduced a series of economic reforms. The purpose of these 
economic reforms was to encourage motivation of the common people by increasing wages 
and prices. That was based on the fact that more income leads to stronger purchasing power 
and a differentiated wage system could be one effective monetary incentive. Specifically, the 
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 July 1st economic reforms included increases in prices and wages, partial abolition of 
rationing system, abolition of exchanged coupons, realistic readjustment of exchange rates, 
strengthening of self-supporting accounting system of corporations, reinforcing material 
incentives, and increasing the autonomous distribution rate of agricultural products.6 The 
contents of July 1st economic reforms are summarized as the following (Table 1):  
 
Table 1 Main Contents of July 1st Economic Reforms in North Korea 
Area Specific Area Main Contents 
Management 
of the Economy 
Consciousness 
- New ways of thinking 
- Encouragement of consciousness and behavior 
 
Law, Institution 
- Enactment or revision of the laws concerning the economy : 
Law of People’s Economic Planning, Law of Loss 
Compensation, Inheritance Law, Agriculture Law, Law for 
Foreign Investment Banks, Treasury Law, Accounting Law, 
Commercial Law 
 
Macro 
Economy 
Price, Wage -Realization of prices and wages 
Treasury 
- Abolition of subsidies 
- Reduction of the budget system organizations 
- Collection of National Payment according to earned income 
- Enactment of National Company Profit 
- Change of the Local Payment System 
                                            
6 Young-Sun Lee and Deok Ryong Yoon, “The Structure of North Korea’s Political Economy: Changes and 
Effects”, Seoul: KIEP Discussion Paper, March, 2004 
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 Industry 
Agriculture 
- Improvement of Unit Management System, Reduction of the 
size of the unit 
- Introduction of Pojeon Damdang-je 
- Abolition of the Foods Rationing System 
 
Production in 
Company 
- Strengthening of responsibility of management 
- Allowance of Trade Market for Company 
- Enlargement of Autonomous Management System 
Merchandising, 
Distribution 
Commercial 
Management 
- Establishment of Goods Supply System excluding foods 
- Introduction of Consignment Sale System in the State-owned 
Stores 
- Allowance of rice and industrial goods sales in the marketplace
Distribution 
- Establishment of the General Market 
- Allowance of the selling Counter Business 
Foreign 
 Economy 
Special  
Economy Zones 
- Additional opening of (Shineuiju), Mt. Geumgang, Gaesung 
Trade Management 
- Foreign Trade by City, Country, and Company Level 
(Decentralization) 
Law and Institution 
for Foreign Trade 
- Actualization of the exchange rate 
- Installation of the Foreign Currency Exchange Place 
- Change of the Foreign Payment System 
Source: Korea Institute for National Unification 
 
The July 1st economic reforms undertaken by North Korea were generally associated with 
four measures. First, the government abolished the coupon system for food rations, relaxed 
price controls, thereby allowing supply and demand to determine prices. In order to meet the 
9 
 
 rise in prices, the government also hiked wage levels. Second, the government abandoned the 
artificially high value of the North Korean won, depreciating their currency from 2.2 won to 
$1 US to 150 won to $1 US. This measure was aimed at inducing foreign investment and 
providing export incentives for domestic firms. Third, the government decentralized 
economic decisions. Measures entailed cutting government subsidies, allowing farmers 
markets to operate, and transplanting managerial decisions for industry and agriculture from 
the central government into the hands of local production units. Fourth, the government 
pressed forward with special administrative and industrial zones to induce foreign investment. 
For instance, the Sinuiju Special Administrative District was a proposal for an open 
economic zone for foreign businesses designed to exist completely outside North Korea 
regular legal strictures. The Kaesong Industrial District was another project designed in 
particular to attract small and medium-sized South Korea businesses, and the Kumgang 
Mountain site provided hard currency from tourism. 
 
2. 3 Main Problems of the North Korean Economic Reforms 
 
There are totally different views on the North Korean economic reforms. That is, the July 1st 
economic reforms taken by North Korea can be seen negative as well as positive. Of course, 
when conducting a new policy, advantage and disadvantage may occur, so North Korea was 
not an exception. It was an unavoidable process when socialistic countries conduct economic 
10 
 
 reform. Here, this paper mainly explores main problems of the North Korean economic 
reforms. 
 
First, the economic reforms dovetailed with North Korea’s “military first” policy. For 
example, in process of the economic reforms, North Korea gave the primacy to the 
development of the defense industry over the agricultural and light industries. In other words, 
military indicators continued to play a larger role than public ones in the overall North 
Korean economic structure. As a consequence, North Korea could not improve the food 
availability. That is, as Kim Jung-Il gave first priority to the military, the rest of the 
population suffered.7 In addition, the exorbitant military expenses and the huge volume of 
military spending became a severe burden for the North Korean economy.8 
 
Second, inflation was the most important cause of negative effects in July 1st economic 
reforms. Under the reforms, overall prices were skyrocketed. For example, the price of rice 
rose by 550 times, for corns 471 times, for diesel oil 38 times, and for electricity 60 times. 
Hereupon, wages were also raised but not enough to keep step with high consumer prices. 
11 
                                            
7 In January 2007, the communist party’s central committee reportedly asked families to “voluntarily” offer 
food to the army, since the food shortage in the people’s army was severe. Yang, Jung A, “Citizens Exploited as 
the Nation Cannot Produce its Own Income”, The Daily NK(Internet edition), January 24, 2007 
8 Some military experts argue that the North Korean defense industry shares 30 percent of total national 
production and the production volume of defense enterprises surpass the production volume of civilian 
industries. See Choo Suk Suh(2002), op.cit., pp.28-30 
 
 Wages rose by 18 times for labors and 20 times for managers.9 These price and wage reforms 
caused households to face uncontrolled consumer inflation, and many people ended up 
suffering from poverty. This poverty led to various kinds of social problems including illegal 
behaviors. In addition, inflation brought discrimination of incomes and broadened the gap 
between the haves and have-nots. In the end, as a consequence of inflation, North Korea 
backtracked on some of its economic reforms by prohibiting private sales of grains and 
reviving a centralized rationing system in the fall of 2005.  
 
Third, July 1st economic reforms were met with disinterest from neighboring countries, 
especially U.S, because these countries had lost faith in the potential of these reforms due to 
the North Korea’s pursuit of secret uranium-based nuclear program at that time. Moreover, 
North Korea’s withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (January 10, 2003) following 
KEDO’s decision to stop providing crude oil (November 14, 2002) to the North Korea 
relegated the economic reforms to the backburner, as North Korea increasingly focused its 
energies on the six-party talks designed to resolve the nuclear crisis.10 Recently, inexplicable 
actions such as this have been provoked by North Korea. For example, almost immediately 
after negotiators had issued the September 19, 2005, Six-Party Statement in which North 
12 
                                            
9 Hong, Ink-pyo, “A Shift Toward Capitalism”, East Asia Review: Winter, 2002, p.96 
10 Chong-Ryel BAE, “The First Ten Years of Kim Jong-il’s Economic Policy”, International Studies Review: 
volume 5, Number 2, October, 2004 
 
 Korea ostensibly committed itself to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear 
programs, North Korea began backtracking and within two months announced a boycott of 
future Six-Party Talks.11 Also, North Korea carried out its first nuclear test on October 9, 
2006, despite warnings not to do so even from China, their major ally. 
 
Fourth, the food situation was further complicated by internal economic policy changes. As a 
matter of fact, these internal policy changes could be expected to impact the availability of 
food on both the supply and demand sides. However, these policies did not attain the 
expected results. On the supply side, it was hoped that the increase in the relative price of 
grains would spur additional supply. Yet North Korean agriculture was highly input-intensive. 
So, it made extensive use of chemical fertilizers and insecticides, electrically powered 
irrigation, and so on. In the event, the ultimate impact of the reforms on agricultural yields 
was strongly influenced by what happens in the industrial sector. On the demand side, the 
North Korean government appears to be trying to ensure survival rations through the public 
distribution system (PDS). The increase in agricultural procurement prices was presumably 
undertaken to increase the amount of food entering the PDS. However, while PDS prices 
have remained largely unchanged since 1 July 2002, market prices have increased 
significantly. 
13 
                                            
11 The Economist, “Asia: The deal that wasn’t North Korea”, London: September 24, 2005, p.81 
 
 2. 4 Current Challenges of the North Korean Economic Reforms 
 
Currently, North Korea seems to perceive itself as being in a policy dilemma. In particular, 
the dilemma is caused by the instability between the North Korea’s “military first” policy and 
its desire to pursue a stable economic reform along with the opening policy. This has been 
the main factor behind the North Korean economy’s present state. As stated above, North 
Korea has focused on the “military first” policy than the economic reform and opening policy. 
However, in 2008, North Korea is placing more emphasis on feeding its people. For example, 
joint newspaper editorial (January 2008) by the Communist Party, military, and youth militia 
stated that “at present, no other task is more urgent or more important than solving the 
people’s food problem and eating problem.”12 The real situation of North Korea’s food crisis 
is shown in Appendix 2. At the same time, in January 2008, Kim Jung-Il stated, “The most 
important and urgent issue for us now is to bring about a turnabout in the building of the 
economy and in the lives of the people.”13 Also, in 2007, President Lee Myung-Bak stated in 
his plan, “Vision 3000: Denuclearization and Openness”, that if North Korea denuclearizes 
and opens, his administration will help to make North Korea’s national income $3,000 per 
person within ten years. The plan, however, does not provide an alternative if North Korea 
14 
                                            
12 BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, “Full text of North Korea’s 2008 New Year’s joint editorial”, London: January 
2, 2008, p.1 
13 Kim Ung-ho, “Main Attack Front in Building a powerful state: Rodong Sinmun”, Translated Open Source 
Center, January 19, 2008 
 
 does not denuclearize.14 So, North Korea at this point in time faces the most typical 
economic trade-off between “guns and butter”. To put it another way, the major question 
with regard to North Korea’s choice is whether North Korea will retain the “guns” (nuclear 
weapons) or give them up in order to obtain the “butter” (economic rehabilitation). 
 
In order to solve the devastating situation which the country faces, first of all, North Korea 
should choose “butter” (economic rehabilitation) rather than “guns” (nuclear weapons). Then, 
effective economic policy should be performed with pursuing system transformation such as 
marketization. Of course, North Korea might be reluctant to transform its system into a 
market system. It may, however, be noted that this choice would be made mainly by the 
economic and political conditions. These conditions are closely related to support from 
neighboring countries. Therefore, it is not too much to say that the future of North Korea 
depends on the policies of neighboring countries, especially the U.S., rather than its own 
policy direction or internal development.15 On the other hand, in order to take support from 
neighboring countries, North Korea should reassure them about the security of the North 
Korean regime. For this, the first thing for North Korea to do is to resolve the nuclear issue 
through diplomatic means. 
15 
                                            
14 Analysis team of the Daily NK, “Lee Myung-Bak’s Administration: A Breakthrough in North Korea’s 
Opening”, The Daily NK (Internet edition), December 12, 2007 
15 Park, Hyeong-Jung, “Ability, Direction, Speed, and Tendency for change in North Korea”, Seoul: Korea 
Institute for National Unification, 2001, p.167 
 
 Chapter 3 New Economic Policy Directions for Successful Economic Reforms 
 
Until now, this paper analyzed the North Korean economic reforms. To sum up, although 
North Korea has finally begun to implement the economic policy for the purpose of 
economic reforms, this economic policy has to date failed to meet expectations. Moreover, 
North Korea’s provocative behavior such as nuclear crisis makes it difficult for countries 
seeking engagement with it to facilitate economic reforms. However, although the nuclear 
crisis is the important issue in order to facilitate the North Korean economic reforms, 
resolving that crisis is only the first step. For North Korea eventually to become a more 
stable and normal country, it also needs to complete the transition from a command economy 
to a market economy. As mentioned above, the most serious problem with North Korean 
economic policy is the fact that it does not have enough elements of system transition such as 
marketization. Indeed, all of the solutions to the North Korean Problem would seem to 
require a successful economic transition within North Korea itself. In addition, even after the 
economic reform, the shortage of food, energy, and raw material have remained with no clear 
signs of increase of production in the overall industry. In particular, the serious lack of 
electricity and other social overhead capital has made it almost impossible to increase supply. 
So, in case of the North Korean economy, it is impossible to make success or overcome the 
shortage of the economical situation with “reform within the system”, that is, “operating the 
economy in order to produce as much profit as possible within the framework of socialist 
16 
 
 principles”.16 Also, the World Economy Organization diagnosed that the least-developed 
countries (LDCs) – the national income per person is approximately one thousand dollar – 
should maintain minimum 5% constant growth rate in order to enter into the take-off stage. 
In this aspect, in order to perform the economic reforms successfully in North Korea, the 
internal environment across the economy should advance toward more practical 
marketization. 
 
On the other hand, North Korea has currently faced a large scale of trade deficit (Table 2). In 
order to straighten out this point, North Korea should perform import restraint and export 
promotion simultaneously. Under the current circumstance, however, export promotion 
policy should be preceded. It is because when domestic resource supply capacity is 
insufficient, restraining importation of necessary resources for production and consumption 
becomes a problem. That is, the most immediate problem in the North Korean economy is 
the lack of supply. Therefore, as North Korea expands the foundation of production through 
the export promotion and inducement of foreign capital, it will have the capability to improve 
productivity in the overall industry. If so, North Korea would be able to escape from the 
current economic structure which has a low growth rate and build a basis for a fast growing 
economy. 
17 
                                            
16 “Let’s Enhance the Dignity and Prestige of the Republic Along with the Great Banner of Son-gun”, The 
Rohdong Shinmun, January 1, 2003. 
 
 Then, from now, this paper explores new policy directions in the North Korean economy 
focusing on marketization, export promotion and inducement of foreign capital. 
 
Table 2 The Actual Foreign Trade Records of North Korea 
(unit: million $, %) 
Year 
Export Import Total 
Balance of 
Trade amount 
Increasing 
rate 
amount
Increasing 
rate 
amount
Increasing 
rate 
1999 515 7.9 965 9.3 1,480 2.6 -450 
2000 556 8.0 1,413 46.4 1,969 33.0 -857 
2001 650 16.9 1,620 14.6 2,270 15.3 -970 
2002 735 13.1 1,525 -5.9 2,260 -0.4 -790 
2003 777 5.5 1,614 5.9 2,391 5.8 -837 
2004 1,020 31.3 1,837 13.8 2,857 19.5 -817 
2005 998 -2.1 2,003 9.1 3,002 5.1 -1,005 
2006 947 -5.2 2,049 2.3 2,996 -0.2 -1,102 
Source: KOTRA 
 
3. 1 Marketization 
 
Before we embark upon an analysis of marketization, let us briefly examine the concept of 
marketization. The marketization is a core element of socialist economic reform. Largely, 
18 
 
 market is divided into two categories. One is a market by system, and the other is a market by 
price. Here, marketization is defined as the introduction and diffusion of the market 
mechanism. 
 
Some specialists regard North Korea’s marketization as it has already been started from the 
July 1st economic reforms. However, North Korea’s marketization can be understood not as a 
top-down state-led process but rather as a bottom-up process in response to state failure. In 
consequence, the macroeconomic situation has not normalized yet. Therefore, North Korea 
should pursue the marketization in the following directions. 
 
First, market activities should be greatly expanded, and market functions should be 
strengthened. To put it another way, it is important to gradually increase the commercial 
transactions in the market. For this purpose, the system transition is needed. Here, system 
transition means the progress from command economy to market economy. Then, what needs 
to be done in order to transform into the market economy? The list of key measures is 
summarized as the following (Table 3). 
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 Table 3 The List of Key Measures for System Transition 
Measure Details 
Privatization • The private ownership of the means of production 
→Motivate firms to maximize efficiency 
• Legalizing various forms of private, quasi-private, and cooperative 
business 
Liberalization • The entrance or withdrawal from a market, job choice, founding 
companies, and business activities should be liberalized. 
Bank Reform • Creating a two-tier banking system  
 →Central bank (top tier) 
: Concern only with the monetary policy and supervision of the rest 
banking system 
→Commercial bank (lower tier) 
  : Take deposits and provide credit for investment. 
Remainder • Scaling down the share of the military in GDP 
→Impact on employment, and on the demand for military goods and 
services (i.e., uniforms, trucks, weapons, etc.) 
→Create many new firms plus employment on diverse construction 
and infrastructure projects. 
  
Second, a free-pricing system should be constructed in order to allow competitive pricing 
through the principle of demand and supply. This will replace the official price system by the 
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 government. In fact, despite the decentralization of pricing authority after July 1st economic 
reforms, North Korean government has still retained pricing authority in a fundamental sense. 
As a result of this, resources could not be allocated efficiently according to market principles. 
Moreover, the official price system by the government has brought about consumer-lining-up 
and a black-market. It could be simplized in Figure 2.. 
 
Figure 2 The Official Price System and Making Black-Market in North Korea 
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Assuming that the supply curve is vertical in North Korea, the price is determined at P1 due 
to the low-price policy (or rationing system). Since the supply is fixed (Q2), the demand 
increases to Q1. So, the excess demand emerges as much as Q1-Q2. At this time, this excess 
 
 demand unavoidably enforces on consumer-lining-up or serves as a momentum to form a 
black-market. That is, excess demand makes a strong motivation for consuming even with a 
high price, leading to formation of a black-market. In this case, the price of black-market 
becomes P2. 
 
In order to fix the free-pricing system, key measures for marketization as mentioned above 
should be preceded, and the shortage of supply should be solved. If so, North Korea will 
obtain the effect of increase of income. It could be summarized in Figure 3. If the market 
competition is allowed, the supply curve moves from S1 to S2. So, under the free-pricing 
system, the official price increases from P1 to P3, and the black-market price reduces from 
P2 to P3. As a consequence, the double price is settled, and the income increases (Q2→Q3). 
However, if North Korean government restricts the supply due to the supply shortage, severe 
inflation will occur since the supply curve is nearly vertical. North Korea already had a bitter 
experience of inflation in the July 1st economic reforms. Therefore, it is important to solve 
the supply shortage for the successful free-pricing system.  
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 Figure 3 The Effect of Increase of Income 
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Third, it is necessary to prepare various complementary measures for the assorted problems 
concerning marketization as follows. : ① inflation, ② unemployment, ③ negligence 
according to decentralization, ④ guidance for sense of value in order to overcome 
ideological confusion, ⑤ bringing up and training for company managers, and ⑥ 
educational efforts to make people adjust to the market economy.17 The policy directions for 
the marketization of North Korea which is mentioned previously is probably unrealistic to do 
everything at once. Nevertheless, it is desirable when these actions take place simultaneously 
in a short term.  
 
17 Lee, Seo-Haeng, “Doi-Moi Policy in Vietnam and the prospect of the Opening in North Korea”, The Results 
of Opening Policy in Vietnam and Its Meaning to North Korea, 2003 Research Contract of the Education Center 
for Unification, 2003, pp.112-113. 
 
 3. 2 Export Promotion / Inducement of Foreign Capital 
 
In order to achieve successful economic reforms for the economic rehabilitation, North 
Korea requires an enormous amount of hard currency and investment. However, Juche, 
North Korea’s autarkic ideology, and the collapse of its industrial production has resulted in 
a minimal level of commercial relations with other countries in the world. It has not 
encouraged foreign trade, and North Korea has had chronic shortages of foreign exchanges. 
Fortunately, after the July 1st economic reforms, North Korea has devised the revitalization 
of trade through decentralization of trade. For example, North Korea allowed the trade 
activity organized by the central government to the local government and companies. Also, 
North Korea has made an effort to attract foreign capital through improving related systems 
to induce foreign direct investment (FDI) and holding a conference of investment explanation 
for overseas Koreans. As a result of this, the trade with other countries has been rising in 
recent years. According to trade statistics compiled by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), North Korea has at least some trade with 80 of the 182 countries or customs territories 
that report their trade data to the IMF.18 However, North Korea still has a poor balance of 
trade since it never exports enough to pay for its imports. In particular, as shown in Table 4, 
the degree of dependence upon trade with China is going to become a deeper chronic 
character in North Korean economy. Accordingly, the industrial production of North Korea is 
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 adhered by the structure that North Korea has to depend upon raw materials, energy, 
equipment and component in China. At the same time, North Korea has a limited ability to 
attract foreign investments because of the amount of debt that is owed to so many different 
countries and the nuclear proliferation issue. Owing to this circumstance, the current North 
Korean economy does not have a spontaneous foundation to produce. 
 
Morocco, indeed, a country of similar size and in certain respects with economic 
characteristics similar to those of North Korea, suffered a similar fall in domestic output in 
the late 1990s, but a combination of increased exports and increased foreign borrowing 
allowed it to cover its trade deficit through imports. North Korea should learn a lesson from 
Morocco case. For North Korea, the foreign trade plays an important role in that it allows the 
country to import food, technology, and other merchandise that it is unable to produce in 
sufficient quantities at home. Therefore, there is no other way for North Korea than to pursue 
more actively the export promotion and inducement of foreign capital. For this, it is 
necessary for North Korea to accept the policy directions as follows. 
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 Table 4 The Change of North Korea-China Trade 
(unit: million $, %) 
Year 
Export Import Total 
Balance of 
Trade amount 
increase 
rate 
amount
increase 
rate 
amount
relative 
importance 
2000 37 − 451 − 488 24.7 -414 
2001 167 348.0 571 26.6 737 32.5 -404 
2002 271 62.3 467 -18.1 738 32.7 -197 
2003 395 46.1 628 34.3 1,023 42.8 -232 
2004 586 48.2 800 27.4 1,385 38.5 -214 
2005 499 -14.8 1,081 35.2 1,580 52.6 -582 
2006 468 -5.8 1,232 13.6 1,699 56.7 -764 
Source: KOTRA 
 
First, it is necessary to increase export capacity. For the purpose of increasing export capacity, 
North Korea should take actions to devaluate the exchange rate against the U.S dollar. As 
shown in Table 4, the current North Korean won – dollar exchange is very irrational. If North 
Korea devaluates its currency, it will cause the following effects. : ① a decrease in the 
amount of foreign currency and other materials for black-market and smuggling ; ② an 
increase of exporting in the official planned economy sector and inducing foreign 
investment ; and ③ an increase in the organic relationship between domestic and foreign 
prices.19  
 
 
                                            
19 Kim, Young-Yoon, “A Study on the reality and prospect of economic reform in North Korea : tasks for 
successful transformation of the North Korea system”, Seoul: Unification Institute, 2007 
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 Table 5 The Change of North Korean Won – Dollar Exchange Rate 
 (North Korean won / dollar) 
1985 1990 1992 1994 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
2.43 2.14 2.13 2.16 2.05 2.19 2.21 153 145 139 136 141 
Source: Ministry of Unification 
 
Second, it is necessary to enlarge the number of countries for trade. As shown in Figure 4, 
the degree of dependence on trade with China is very high. This may weaken the production 
foundation. To solve this problem, North Korea should construct partnerships with various 
foreign firms such as FDI or significant ownership stakes in North Korean business. Then, 
the expertise and market access of the partner firms will be available to upgrade North 
Korean production. Furthermore, more participation from various partners will not only 
increase the available capital but also reduce the unhealthy one-side dependency on China. 
At the same time, North Korea should create a number of new small firms in virtually all 
sectors. The reason is because many of these firms will no doubt fail quite rapidly, as is 
normal in well functioning market. However, some will survive to grow larger in the future, 
providing employment, incomes and exports to North Korea.20 These new small firms will 
have the capability to promote export with the employment creation. 
 
                                            
20 Paul Hare, “Industrial Policy for North Korea : Lessons from Transition”, CERT (Center for Economic 
Reform and Transformation), September, 2006 
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 Third, supplementary measures that can help to promote exports and induce foreign capital 
are needed. To begin with, North Korea should adopt a proper measure to do away with the 
practice of the elite’s spending on expensive and unproductive imported consumer goods. 
That is because scare resources are unproductively wasted for luxuries or prestige projects, 
instead of finding their way into productive investments. Accordingly, North Korea should 
not only levy high taxes on high incomes, but also support industrials who are expected to 
reinvest their income into production. The latter has been done very successfully in South 
Korea, where the industrial conglomerates (chaebol) have been utilized as “private agencies 
of public purpose”.21 On the other hand, North Korean embassies around the world should 
expand their commercial task. That is, it is necessary to gather the market information in 
various countries and convey it back to its business community. 
 
Figure 4 Relative Importance of Trade with Major Countries in North Korea 
 
Source: KOTRA 
 
                                            
21 Woo, Jung-en, “Race to the swift : State and Finance in Korean Industrialization”, New York : Columbia 
University Press, 1991 
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 Chapter 4  The Required Roles of Neighboring Countries for Supporting North 
Korean Economic Reforms 
 
 
Until now, this paper examined some policy directions in the North Korean economy in order 
to implement successful economic reforms. However, although North Korea performs the 
economy policy mentioned above, without assistance of neighboring countries North Korea 
cannot accomplish the successful economic reforms. As a matter of fact, currently, except 
South Korea and China there are little countries that make investments in North Korea. The 
reason is because most of the advanced countries hesitate to invest in North Korea due to the 
inferior investment environment. Moreover, North Korea is counted out from the investable 
countries due to the international political issues such as nuclear crisis. However, considering 
North Korea’s present capability, North Korea cannot make a successful economic reform 
without obtaining considerable international cooperation. Needless to say, South Korea 
unfortunately does not have enough capability to help the North Korean economic reforms 
on its own. In this regard, the most feasible approach to facilitate North Korean economic 
reforms is to create a framework of international cooperation. In order to obtain international 
cooperation, of course, North Korea should satisfy several preconditions – alleviate security 
concerns; pursue more proactively ideational, behavioral, and institutional changes in the 
economic domain; improve human rights; and demonstrate more credible international 
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 behavior.22 In any case, South Korea and powerful neighboring countries has to play very 
important roles for the North Korea’s successful reforms in order to reduce the instability 
caused by North Korea’s economic problems and nuclear standoff. At this time, as for the 
approach-toward-North Korea, South Korea and powerful neighboring countries shall avoid 
the “carrot-or-stick” debate and rather concentrate on building up a more practical plan to 
facilitate North Korean economic reforms. Then, from now, this paper examines the required 
roles of important countries for successful North Korean economic reforms. 
 
4. 1 The Roles of South Korea: South-North Economic Cooperation 
 
To begin with, this paper examines the roles of South Korea. Until now, economic relations 
have been a major route for opening relations between the two Koreas. In particular, South 
Korea has worked to activate the economic cooperation programs with North Korea since the 
mid-1990s. As a consequence of these efforts, the volume of inter-Korean trade during the 
last decade has been increased dramatically (Figure 5). Specifically, under the “Sunshine 
Policy” of former President Kim Dae Jung and the “Policy for Peace and Prosperity” of 
former President Roh Moo-hyun, South Korea has permitted its corporations to pursue 
business interests in North Korea. In addition to the business relationships, South and North 
Korea have been reconnecting the Gyeongui (Seoul-Sinuiju) and Donghae (East Sea) railway 
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 lines and adjacent highways. Nevertheless, South Korea has been criticized over policy 
toward North Korea because South Korea’s policy keeping economic relationship with North 
Korea was inconsistent and ineffective during the last decade. So, President Lee Myung-bak 
indicated in his inaugural that South Korea’s attitude toward inter-Korean relations should be 
pragmatic, not ideological. He also reiterated his plan to provide assistance in order to raise 
the per capita income of North Korea to $3,000 within ten years if North Korea 
denuclearizes.23 For the purpose of North Korea’s successful economic reforms, South Korea 
is a key player but in a delicate position. Then, where does South Korea’s role lie on? 
 
Figure 5 South Korean Merchandise Trade with North Korea 
(unit: $ in thousands) 
 
Source: Ministry of Unification, KOTRA 
 
First, it is important for South Korea to make North Korea cooperate. To begin with, the 
profit and loss from the South-North cooperation or non-cooperation could be simplized as 
                                            
23 Inauguration Speech of President Lee Myung-bak, February 25, 2008, on website of the South Korean 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. [http://www.mofat.go.kr/index.jsp] 
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 Figure 6. Assuming that both players (the South and the North) cannot make bargains since 
there is no way to hold another player to an agreement, Nash equilibrium is [Non-
cooperation, Non-cooperation].24 However, a social optimum is [Cooperation, Cooperation] 
because it is the solution which maximizes the total benefits to the players. Thus, in order to 
secure collective benefits even when it is not in their best immediate private interests to do so, 
it is necessary to have the infinitely repeated bargaining.25 
 
Figure 6 A Payoff Matrix between South and North Korea 
  < South Korea > 
  Cooperation Non-cooperation 
< North Korea > 
Cooperation 1, 1 -2, 2 
Non-cooperation 2, -2 -1, -1 
 
As shown in Table 6, the official meetings between South and North Korea have been 
increased from the first summit in 2000. Currently, however, the official meetings have been 
decreased again. It means that the chances of infinitely repeated bargaining are reduced. 
Therefore, South Korea should elicit bargaining from North Korea for cooperation. For this, 
                                            
24 A Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies, one for each player, such that, given the strategies being played by 
the others, no player can improve on their payoff by adopting an alternative strategy 
25 An infinitely repeated bargaining is one in which the stage bargaining has an unspecified number of 
repetitions. 
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 it is necessary for South Korea to establish a standing framework for bargaining with North 
Korea. At the same time, South Korea should take a leading role in engineering international 
cooperation. To this end, there is need for skillfully mobilizing the support of other nations. 
 
Second, it is necessary for South Korea to create a direct trading system with North Korea.26 
After this system finally sets up, it will contribute to the activation of trade between South 
and North Korea by creating direct channels of communication. Moreover, the majority of 
inefficiency such as problems in communication, advancing claims, inconvenience of 
payment, time and cost will be resolved. For example, agreement on the place of origin will 
reduce the dual paperwork or indirect payment, and it will also eliminate the possibility of 
fraud exports from the third countries. In the long run, a direct trading system will help the 
North Korea’s rehabilitation. At the same time, it will contribute to the increase of interests 
of related South Korean companies. It may, however, be noted that South Korea should 
establish a supporting system in order to activate direct trade. To put it another way, it is 
required to install the channels for negotiation, reconnect the mail and phone lines, introduce 
a direct payment system, coordinate various kinds of conflicts, and prevent the risk of suits in 
the WTO concerning the direct trading system. 
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26 A direct trading system means that South and North Korea could trade directly with each other without any 
mediating third country. 
 
 Table 6 Official Meetings between South and North Korea 
 
Politics Military Economic 
Humanitarian, 
Social, Culture 
Total 
2000 6 4 3 2 15 
2001 2 2 3 1 8 
2002 4 9 14 5 32 
2003 5 6 17 8 36 
2004 2 5 13 3 23 
2005 10 3 11 10 34 
2006 5 4 8 6 23 
2007 3 5 10 6 24 
Total 37 38 79 41 195 
Source: Ministry of Unification 
 
Third, South Korea should support expansion of the Gaesong Industrial Complex (GIC). The 
GIC is national project designed to enhance peace and to build economic regionalism 
through cooperation on the Korean peninsula and East Asia. In addition, the GIC in North 
Korea is a symbol of inter-Korean economic cooperation and can play a critical role in 
linking the country to the East Asian market. Fortunately, this joint effort between the South 
and North is exploiting rapidly, despite tension over North Korea’s testing of ballistic 
missiles and a nuclear weapon. The GIC serves both geopolitical and economic purpose. 
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 Geopolitically, the GIC provides a rapprochement channel between the two Koreas, a method 
of defusing tensions, a way to expose North Korea to external ideas and ways of doing 
business. Economically, the KIC provides small and medium sized South Korean firms with 
a low-cost supply of labor for manufacturing products, jobs for North Korean workers, and 
needed hard currency for North Korea. In addition, it can serve as an empirical test to prove 
whether South-North economic cooperation can contribute to the enhancement of political 
and military peace on the Korean peninsula. As a matter of fact, South-North economic 
cooperation is not simply an economic issue, but also has direct connections to military and 
political security issues. Therefore, South Korea should encourage more profit-oriented direct 
investment in North Korea by South Korean companies. For example, it is necessary to offer 
incentives for investing in North Korea instead of China. At the same time, South Korea 
should emphasize transparency in financial transactions with North Korea in order to support 
the growth of effective GIC. 
 
4. 2 The Roles of Other Neighboring Countries: U.S, China, Japan, Russia 
 
4.2.1 The Roles of the U.S: Further Relief of Economic Sanctions 
 
For the purpose of accomplishing U.S goals and protecting U.S national interests, the U.S 
conducts three legs of grand strategy – economic, diplomatic, and military means – toward 
North Korea. In particular, the U.S has used the economic sanctions as leverage and to send a 
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 message of disapproval for various activities by North Korea. As a result of these sanctions, 
the U.S currently does not maintain any diplomatic, consular, or trade relations with North 
Korea. And the U.S does not have normal trade relations – Most Favored Nation (MFN) – 
status. Also, as shown in Table 7, the U.S trade with North Korea is quite limited. In 
particular, North Korea is on the most restricted list of countries for U.S exports (Country 
Group E list) of items such as computers, software, national security – controlled items, 
items on the Commerce Control List, and service or repair of such items.27 Moreover, the 
U.S maintains various economic sanctions on North Korea for four primary reasons : ① 
North Korea is considered as a threat to U.S national security; ② North Korea is designated 
by the Secretary of State as a state supporter of international terrorism; ③ North Korea is a 
communist state; and ④ North Korea proliferates weapons of mass destruction (see 
Appendix 4). 
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 Table 7 U.S Trade with North Korea in 2004 – 2007 
SITC Category 
U.S Exports U.S Imports 
’04 ’05 ’06 ’07 ’04 ’05 ’06 ’07
Cereals and Cereal Preparations 10,285 2,277 0 1,728 0 0 0 0 
Fixed Vegetable Fats and Oils 4,259 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vegetables 3,461 1,806 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Preparations of Cereal, Flour, 
Starch or Milk; Bakers Wares 
2,459 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Misc.Grain, Seed, Fruit 0 1,573 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dairy Products and Birds’ Eggs 1,157 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Misc. Textile Articles 191 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Organic Chemicals 0 0 0 0 1,418 0 0 0 
Woven Apparel 0 0 0 0 77 0 0 0 
Tools, Cutlery 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 
Books, Newspapers 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 23,750 5,757 3 1,728 1,495 3 0 0 
Source: U.S Department of Commerce accessed through World Trade Atlas 
 
Fortunately, some favorable omens have been shown in the U.S-North Korea relation from 
last year (2007). For example, in October 2007, it was reported that President Bush approved 
the lifting of some sanctions imposed on North Korea under an act governing human 
trafficking. This easing allowed the U.S to provide assistance in educational and cultural 
exchanges to the extent that the aid does not damage its national interest.28 In addition, in 
                                            
28 Yoon, Won-sup, “U.S Eased Sanctions on North Korea in 2007”, Korea Times, February 12, 2008 
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 February 2008, the New York Philharmonic Orchestra performed in Pyongyang.29 Recently, 
North Korea demolished the cooling tower at North Korea’s Youngbyon nuclear facility. It 
means that North Korea used the most powerful bargaining chip in order to get economic 
assistance and the security guarantee from the U.S. 
 
At this point, it is necessary for the U.S to consider whether economic sanctions have 
actually worsened economic conditions in North Korea and whether the poor economic 
conditions have changed policies in North Korea. Historically, the economic sanctions had 
little effect on North Korea’s behavior in the way that would achieve the U.S goals. On the 
contrary, U.S’s soft-land policy toward North Korea made North Korea carry out economic 
reforms. Specifically, according to the engagement policy proposed by Perry Report in 1999, 
U.S induced change of the North Korean policy. At the same time, irrespective of whether 
the U.S economic sanctions worsened North Korea’s economy, the poor economic state of 
North Korea has indirectly affected U.S national interests. For instance, it has necessitated 
humanitarian aid and has generated a deficit in trade that North Korea has attempted to fill by 
dealing in illegal drugs and missiles. Thus, from this time forth, the U.S policy with respect 
to North Korea should focus on increasing engagement to include positive economic 
incentives for the North Korea’s rehabilitation over the long term. 
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 First, it is necessary to normalize economic relations with North Korea. Although it cannot 
be expected soon, the normalization of economic relations will have a number of positive 
effects on the U.S national interests as well as the North Korean economy. From the 
viewpoint of North Korea, providing normal trade relations status (MFN) and the General 
System of Preference (GSP) to North Korea will increase the price competitiveness of the 
country’s exports in the U.S market. On the other hand, from the viewpoint of the U.S, the 
U.S companies interested in doing business in North Korea, especially establishing a 
company, will be able to work more actively. Indeed, some U.S business executives 
reportedly are traveling to North Korea for business purpose, and some U.S enterprises 
reportedly are working as subcontractors in the development of North Korea’s Kaesong 
Industrial Complex (KIC).30 Hence, the normalization of economic relations could cover 
investment and other U.S interests. 
 
Second, the U.S should stop blocking North Korea from joining the international financial 
institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Asian 
Development Bank. As a matter of fact, given that the U.S is the largest stakeholder in IFIs, 
its influence on these institutions’ decision-making has been critical. IFIs will allow North 
Korea to receive development assistance, and eventually it will assist North Korea in its 
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 rehabilitation and economic transition. As previously stated, the inducement of foreign 
investment is needed for North Korea’s rehabilitation and transition. And, for inducing 
foreign investment, it is important to build international assurance that the host country will 
provide a stable and favorable environment for foreign investors. In this regard, the role of 
IFIs cannot be underestimated. To put it another way, without assurance from IFIs, foreign 
firms will not invest in North Korea. In addition, the various IFIs’ economic support for 
North Korea will be able to prevent the North Korea’s economic over-dependence on any 
particular country, especially China. It will enable the U.S to have advantageous standpoint 
over the North Korean issues in the future. 
 
Third, the U.S should provide assistance in any of a variety of forms. In particular, it is 
deeply necessary to provide fuel and food aid. In the Six-Party Talks, North Korea always 
appears to be most concerned with obtaining fuel and food aid in exchange for concessions 
on its nuclear program. In order to provide assistance to North Korea, it is necessary to delete 
North Korea from a list of countries barred from U.S assistance under successive foreign aid 
appropriations laws. In the case of recent foreign aid appropriations, those countries named 
as ineligible for U.S direct assistance have been the same countries as those on the terrorism 
list. However, foreign aid appropriations laws do not apply the sanctions to countries on the 
terrorism list per se. Therefore, North Korea’s removal from the terrorism list does not mean 
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 the automatic lifting of various economic sanctions. In fact, sanctions were in most respects 
inferior to assistance through the experience of the last years. In the short run, of course, 
economic sanction can be very effective. In the long run, however, it loses its impact and 
becomes a liability. That is, the longer a sanction lasts, the smaller its effect, and the bigger 
the chance for a successful bypass. Thus, it is desirable for the U.S to omit North Korea from 
the list of countries named as ineligible for U.S direct assistance. 
 
4.2.2 The Other Countries: China, Japan, and Russia 
 
Although it is true that the role of South Korea and U.S is very important, North Korea’s 
rehabilitation cannot be attained through only the effort of South Korea and U.S. In the light 
of geopolitics, one can say that all issues related to North Korea are closely connected with 
interests of powerful neighboring countries. Hence, the role of powerful neighboring 
countries (China, Japan, and Russia) is very important like South Korea and U.S. Then, we 
will examine the required roles of these countries from now. 
 
First, China remains North Korea’s chief ally. In addition, China has been the North Korea’s 
largest trading partner and supplier of concessional assistance since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Table 8 shows China’s merchandise trade with North Korea. In this regard, it would 
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 be no exaggeration to state that China’s alliance with North Korea during the last decade 
helped prevent the collapse of the North Korean economy.  
 
Table 8 China’s Merchandise Trade with North Korea, 1995-2007 
(unit: $ in millions) 
Year China’s Imports China’s Exports Total Trade China’s Balance 
1995 63.609 486.037 549.646 422.428
1996 68.638 497.014 565.652 428.376
1997 121.610 534.411 656.021 412.801
1998 51.089 356.661 407.750 305.572
1999 41.722 328.634 370.356 286.912
2000 37.214 450.839 488.053 413.625
2001 166.797 570.660 737.457 403.863
2002 270.863 467.309 738.172 196.446
2003 395.546 627.995 1,023.541 232.449
2004 582.193 794.525 1,376.718 212.332
2005 496.511 1,084.723 1,581.234 588.212
2006 467.718 1,231.886 1,699.604 764.168
2007 581.521 1,392.453 1,973.974 810.932
Source: Chinese (PRC excluding Hong Kong) data as supplied by World Trade Atlas. 
 
Moreover, China arguably has more influence on North Korea during its policy decision-
making process than any other nation. Consequently, China’s economic assistance and 
preferential bilateral trade with North Korea will be crucial for the North Korean economic 
reforms. However, it is not enough to accelerate the North Korean economic reforms. Indeed, 
first of all, North Korea currently needs to promote its capacity to implement its economic 
policy. In this respect, China can play an important role to teach how to get rid of political 
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 obstacles that prevents the economic openness and reforms. In addition, the Korean peninsula 
possesses great strategic interests of China. For example, North Korea’s economic 
rehabilitation and increased inter-Korean economic cooperation would have positive effects 
on the economic development of China. Furthermore, long-term economic benefits can be 
generated for China through formulating a trilateral North Korea-China-South Korea 
economic cooperation. Therefore, China should cooperate more actively such as providing 
strong support at the government level and promoting the direct investment activities of 
Chinese enterprises. 
 
Second, Japan and North Korea maintained significant economic ties for well over a decade. 
In fact, Japan was second only to China among North Korea’s top trading partners from the 
end of the Cold War. However, Japan’s economic relations with North Korea have declined 
sharply as tension over North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs has spiked. After North 
Korea test launched several missiles in July 2006, Japan imposed strict unilateral sanctions. 
As indicated in Table 9, total trade between Japan and North Korea has fallen since 2006. In 
particular, Japan had no imports from North Korea in 2007. In addition, Japan and North 
Korea have never established official diplomatic relations. If Japan and North Korea will 
normalize diplomatic relations, North Korea will be able to use concessionary funds from 
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 Japan to restore agricultural facilities and implement various socio-economic development 
projects that are urgently needed for North Korea’s rehabilitation (see Appendix 4). 
 
Table 9 Japan’s Merchandise Trade with North Korea, 1995-2007 
(unit: $ in millions) 
Year 
Japan’s 
Imports 
Japan’s 
Exports 
Total Trade Japan’s Balance 
1995 338.073 253.798 591.871 -84.275
1996 290.745 226.480 517.225 -64.265
1997 301.796 178.942 480.738 -122.854
1998 219.489 175.137 394.626 -44.352
1999 202.564 147.839 350.403 -54.725
2000 256.891 206.760 463.651 -50.131
2001 225.618 1,064.519 1,290.14 838.901
2002 235.840 132.645 368.485 -103.195
2003 174.390 91.445 265.835 -82.945
2004 164.299 88.743 253.042 -75.556
2005 132.277 62.505 194.782 -69.772
2006 77.776  43.816  121.592 -33.96
2007 0.000 9.331 9.331 9.331
Source: Japanese data as supplied by World Trade Atlas 
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 On the other hand, an improvement in North Korea-Japan relations will contribute to regional 
economic cooperation, particularly in the areas of transportation and energy. Furthermore, 
there is no doubt that a normalization agreement between Japan and North Korea would 
certainly encourage Japanese private investment and multinational participation in regional 
cooperation projects. Therefore, Japan should put more effort into improving its relationship 
with North Korea.  
 
Third, Russian reformed and the end of the cold war greatly reduced the priority of North 
Korea in the strategy of Russian foreign policy. Recently, however, relations between 
Russian and North Korea have been improving. In particular, Russia is upgrading its railway 
connections with North Korea and has been participating in an ambitious plan to build a 
trans-Korean railway. Moreover, Russia has gained unique and exclusive communications 
capabilities with North Korea based on the development of trust between the leadership of 
the two states at the highest political levels.31 However, Russia-North Korea relations also 
face some challenges. Since Russia shares a border with North Korea, Russia is critical to 
North Korean security. In addition, economic hardships in North Korea will push refugees 
across the border into Russian territory. Hence, Russian cooperation with North Korea would 
be necessary to enforce any security guarantee. On the other hand, North Korean industrial 
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 facilities constructed with Soviet technical assistance account for 30 percent of total steel 
output, 40 percent of iron mine production, 50 percent of petrochemical production, 13 
percent of chemical fertilizer production and 20 percent of textile goods. It means that 
Russian technical assistance is required for repairing and upgrading of North Korean 
industrial facilities. Thus, Russia’s role is very important in the rehabilitation of North 
Korea’s industry. 
 
Chapter 5.  Conclusion  
 
 
Up to now this paper has looked at the North Korean economic reforms. In this connection, 
this paper has examined new policy directions in the North Korean economy. At the same 
time, this paper has explored the roles of neighboring countries for North Korea’s 
rehabilitation and system transition. My purpose in this paper thus far has been to examine 
the economic policy directions in North Korea for accomplishing successful economic 
reforms and to explore the required roles of South Korea, U.S and other neighboring 
countries (China, Japan, and Russia). 
 
Previous to the collapses of Soviet Union, poor domestic economic performance in North 
Korea was offset with infusions of Soviet aid. But after the collapses of Soviet Union in 1991, 
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 the aid stopped and the North Korean economy was adversely affected. This situation was 
further complicated by severe food shortages that began in 1995-96 which continues up to 
today. Moreover, the official economy was nearly brought to a standstill because of the 
dramatic expansion of the private economy. 32  Thus, people desperately needed some 
solutions to survive. For this reason, North Korea tried to reduce the non-official sector and 
improve the operation of the official sector. Hence, it is more reasonable to think that 
economic reforms in North Korea had no intention to transform into a market economy 
system but to normalize the official sector. In this respect, it can be said that economic 
reforms in North Korea is in an elementary stage. However, provided that the reform in this 
stage will be successful, North Korea can pursue more drastic reform in the future. 
 
To begin with, North Korea should embrace overall economic reforms based on the market 
principle. At the same time, it is necessary for North Korea to pursue more actively the 
export promotion and inducement of foreign capital. To be sure, North Korea attempted to 
partially accept market mechanisms in the view of system through market expansion 
measures and the revision of the legal system. However, these measures were designed to 
prevent rapid change of the principles keeping North Korean society intact by reflecting the 
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Effects”, Soviet Studies: vol.32, April, 1980) 
 
 change from the bottom. It is not enough to accomplish a successful rehabilitation. As a 
matter of fact, North Korea is in dilemma because opening up its economy and reforming its 
economic system could lead to the collapse of the regime. Therefore, what is the most 
required to North Korea is Kim Jung-Il’s “New Thinking” like former Soviet leader Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s perestroika (restructuring). 
 
On the other hand, economic reforms alone cannot rehabilitate the North Korean economy. 
Without international cooperation its prospects for sustaining reforms is grim. In order to 
induce international cooperation, of course, North Korea should resolve nuclear crisis. As 
long as nuclear crisis persists, U.S and other neighboring countries will not cooperate with 
each other for the North Korean economic reforms. However, it is also necessary for 
neighboring countries to consider the fact that North Korea is now concerning itself about 
any internal confusion and the potential shockwave to the security after the economic 
reforms. In this respect, South Korea, U.S and other neighboring countries (China, Japan, and 
Russia) should continue to cooperate for the market system development in North Korea. The 
reason is because strong international cooperation for the North Korean economic reforms 
will be able to gradually improve North Korea’s internal conditions, thereby helping North 
Korea to become an important member in upholding peace and maintaining the stability of 
political state. In addition, when North Korea is cautiously adopting policy changes in order 
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 to overcome its international isolation, it is important that neighboring countries create a 
favorable environment in which North Korea will be able to direct its efforts towards 
economic openness. Consequently, South Korea, U.S and other neighboring countries should 
actively take role in helping North Korea to become a normal and equal member in 
international society by taking necessary steps. 
 
The conclusion which can be drawn from this study is as follows. First, South Korea should 
create more various “dialog channel” and a direct trading system with North Korea. Second, 
U.S should relieve further economic sanctions to North Korea. Specifically, it is necessary to 
normalize economic relations with North Korea. Also, it is time that U.S stopped blocking 
North Korea from joining the international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World 
Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Asian Development Bank. Third, China and Russia 
should cooperate more actively such as providing strong support at the governmental level 
while Japan should put more effort into improving its relationship with North Korea. 
 
Finally, I would like to close by proposing that “a grand bargain” among South Korea, North 
Korea and neighboring countries is urgently needed. Therefore, South Korea and neighboring 
countries need to pay more attention to actively cooperate with North Korea so that economic 
rehabilitation and the system transition of North Korea can take place. 
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 [Appendix 1] Changes in North Korea’s Economic Management since 2002 
 Before the July 1st Reform After the July 1st Reform 
Price  
system 
→ Serious state-led price distortions: 
* The prices of goods and services were 
determined by central state economic 
organs 
* The prices of consumer goods and 
agricultural products were maintained at 
prices considerably lower than those that 
would have been arrived at in a market 
system 
→ A very large discrepancy between 
state-set prices and farmers’ market prices 
(over 10-100 times) : 
* Consumer goods and food items in 
state-run stores had very limited 
availability due to supply problems 
* Almost every product was available at 
farmers’ markets, although the prices at 
these markers were much higher than 
those at state-owned stores 
→ Price raising of most goods and services by 
10-fold to 100-fold or even higher: 
* Price raising aims to reduce price discrepancies 
through increasing government-set prices close to 
prices found at farmer’s markets 
* Price increases for services include electricity, 
transportation fares and rent. 
→ The complete abolishment of the decades-long 
system of state subsidies for “price differentials” 
(the difference between the actual  production 
cost and the retail price) : 
* Production costs, international prices, and 
domestic supply and demand are the main 
considerations in determining prices. 
* North Korea’s fiscal burden increases, as does 
its inflation rate 
Wage  
system 
→ Unrealistic wage levels : 
* In the rationing system, the government 
was responsible for providing the general 
public with food, consumer commodities 
and housing nearly free of charge 
* Monthly wages were low 
* The flourishing of farmers’ markets and 
the expansion of the dual price system led 
to a drastic increase in living costs 
* More North Koreans were actively 
engaged in second economic activities 
since state-set wages were insufficient to 
pay for products sold at farmer’s markets 
→ An increase in wage levels : 
* The average monthly wage of North Koreans is 
reportedly increased by 18 times 
* The wage increases aim to compensate for the 
higher cost of living caused by the price hikes of 
goods and services 
→ The introduction of a discriminatory wage 
policy : 
* Wage levels are determined by an individual’s 
occupation, the quality of his/her work, personal 
contributions to the group and overall group 
accomplishment 
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  Before the July 1st Reform After the July 1st Reform 
State 
Planning  
Mechanism 
→ A rigid planning mechanism : 
* Economic management was handled 
by the National Planning Committee 
on the basis of the ‘unified and 
detailed planning principle’ 
* State-level planning organizations 
were responsible for the production 
activities of all sub-economic units 
nationwide 
→ The partial decentralization of the state 
planning system : 
* The role of the National Planning Committee 
is reduced to formulating provincial targets for 
industrial production and major infrastructure 
construction as well as to managing 
strategically important projects of the national 
economy 
 
Management 
of 
 state-owned 
enterprises 
→ Tight control by national planning 
agencies over management activities 
of enterprises and factories : 
* The exercise of independent 
management by enterprises was 
prohibited, leading to a reliance on the 
government for subsidies 
→ A dependency on the state for the 
supply of raw materials : 
* The trade of raw and supplementary 
materials was possible only through 
contracts between state-owned 
enterprises, not through a market 
system 
→ The Partial liberalization of the decision-
making process at state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) : 
* Through obligated to achieve production 
goals, state-owned enterprises are granted 
considerable autonomy in running their 
businesses 
→ Emphasis on a self-supporting business 
system : 
* Government subsidies previously given to 
state-owned enterprises are largely reduced 
→ The establishment of raw material 
exchange markets 
Material 
Incentives  
→ A lack of material incentives for 
workers : 
* Workers’ wages and their supply of 
food were distributed more or less 
evenly based on the work unit they 
belonged to, regardless of the quality 
of their work and their individual 
contribution 
* The distribution principle based on 
workload was in name only 
→ The strengthening of the material incentive 
system to encourage labor productivity :  
* The performance of SOEs is evaluated on 
the basis of business profits rather than 
production amounts 
* The government assigns more of its budget 
to profit-making factories and enterprises  
Source: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy 
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 [Appendix 2] North Korean Food Crisis Since 2006 
Date Condition of Food and Public Distribution 
2006 - South Korea government totally stopped humanitarian aid right after the missile test and the 
nuclear experiment. 
- After the food damages in July 2006, total agricultural production in 2006 was estimated 2.8 
million tons including 1.8 million tons of total food production of each province. 
- The fear that there would be another Arduous March in 2007 surged. 
2007.01 - There was no distribution for New Year’s Day (3 day amount of long-grain rice was distributed 
only in Pyongyang). 
- The amount of food supply to the military dropped to 60%. 
2007.02 - After Chairman Kim Jong-Il’s visit to major cities throughout the country and the release of rice 
for the military to the public, food price fell. 
- Total 4 day amount of food was distributed due to overlapping of Lunar New Year’s Day and 2.16 
holiday (birthday of Kim Jong Il). 
2007.03 - The residents’ rice purchasing power did not increase. 
- Restriction on rice trading in markets was intensified.  
2007.04 - 2 day amount of food was distributed on April 15th (birthday of Kim Il Sung). 
2007.05 - The price of rice went up from 800 Won/kg to 900~950 Won/kg, simultaneously around the 
country. 
2007.06 - In major cities, rice was traded at 950~1,000 Won/kg 
- From late June, starvation to death began to occur. 
2007.07 - The price of rice went up 1,200~1,300 Won/kg, nationally in mid-July. 
- All the regions including Hamgyung, Kwangwon, and Pyongan Provinces suffered from rice 
shortage. 
 
2007.08 - Except some regions including Chugnjin, the nation suffered from flood. 
- After the flood damage, the price of rice increased up to 1,500~1,800 Won/kg 
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 2007.09 - In Hwanghae Province, the price of rice hit the price 1,700 Won/kg (the highest price in history). 
- The price of corn increased to 550~650 Won nationwide including Pyongyang, Chungjin and 
Sinuiju area. 
- Inspection of rice trading in the market resumed. 
 
2007.10 - Inspection of the minimum age for trading in the market begun around the nation.               
- The price of rice went down during the harvest season. 
 
2007.11 - The price of rice dropped to 1,200~1,300 Won/kg, but the price of corn stayed at 450~600 
Won/kg. 
- Agricultural production from individually cultivated farm patches decreased 
2007.12 - Due to decline in production of each collective farm, food distribution time was delayed and the 
distribution amount was decreased. : Farmers concerned about that food would run out at the end of 
February. 
2008.01 - At the end of food distribution, the food price trend rebounded. 
- There was a setback in food import because of drastically increased duties on food items by China 
and required report of SGS quality verification imported Chinese food products by North Korean 
custom house. 
2008.02 - 20% of the families in rural were expected to run out of food on February, and 40% of those would 
be on late March 
- North Korea authority surveyed food possession of farmer’s households. 
2008.03 - Attendance rate decreased at munitions factories in Eunduk Country North Hamgyung Province 
and Chungjin Gimchaek Steel mill. 
- Farm workers attendance rate plummeted because of the food shortage in the breadbasket regions, 
which caused serious problems in preparing for farming season. 
2008.04 - The second Arduous March has begun. 
- The price of grains skyrocketed: 2,800 Won/kg for rice, 1,800Won/kg for corn. 
- Speculation of rice conducted by some money owners increased, expecting the price would rise up 
to 3,000Won. : It became hard to find food in markets. 
Source: Report on the food crisis in North Korea By Good Friends 
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 [Appendix 3] Economic Sanctions Imposed on North Korea 
Rationale Restriction 
Statutory Basis
(Regulation) 
Authority 
to Impose 
Authority to Lift 
or Wave 
General 
foreign 
policy 
reasons 
Limits the export of 
goods or services 
Export 
Administration 
Act of 1979 
President, 
Secretary of 
Commerce  
President, 
Secretary of 
Commerce 
General 
foreign 
policy 
reasons 
Limits proportionate 
share to international 
organizations which, 
in turn, expend funds 
in North Korea 
Sec.307, 
Foreign 
Assistance Act 
of 1961 
Statutory 
requirement 
No waiver; 
exemption for 
certain IAEA 
programs 
General 
foreign 
policy 
reasons 
Prohibits assistance 
from defense 
appropriations 
Sec.8042, 
Department of 
Defense 
Appropriations 
Act, 2007 
Statutory 
requirement 
No waiver 
Diplomatic 
relations 
severed 
Prohibits most 
foreign aid and 
agricultural sales 
under P.L. 480 
Sec. 620(t), 
Foreign 
Assistance Act 
of 1961 
Statutory 
requirement 
No waiver 
National 
security 
controls, 
communism 
Limits the export of 
goods or services 
Sec. 5, Export 
Administration 
Act of 1979 
President President 
Communism Prohibits foreign aid Sec.620(t), 
Foreign 
Assistance Act 
of 1961 
Statutory 
requirement 
President 
Communism Limits proportionate 
share to international 
organizations which, 
in turn, expected 
funds in North Korea 
Sec. 307, 
Foreign 
Assistance Act 
of 1961 
Statutory 
requirement 
No waiver; 
exemption for 
certain IAEA 
programs 
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 Rationale Restriction 
Statutory Basis
(Regulation) 
Authority 
to Impose 
Authority to Lift 
or Wave 
Communism Prohibits Export-
Import Bank funding 
to Marxist-Leninist 
states 
Sec.2(b)(2), 
Export-Import 
Bank Act of 
1945 
Statutory 
requirement 
President 
Communism Prohibits support in 
the IFIs 
Sec.43, Bretton 
Woods 
Agreement Act
Statutory 
requirement 
Secretary of the 
Treasury 
Communism Limits the export of 
goods or services 
Sec.5(b), 
Export 
Administration 
Act of 1979 
Statutory 
requirement 
President 
Communism Denies favorable 
trade terms 
Sec. 401, Trade 
Act of 1974 
Statutory 
requirement 
President 
Nonmarket 
economy 
and 
emigration 
Denies favorable 
trade terms 
Sec. 402, Trade 
Act of 1974 
Statutory 
requirement 
President 
Nonmarket 
economy 
and 
emigration 
Denies favorable 
trade terms 
Sec. 409, Trade 
Act of 1974 
President President 
Communism 
and market 
disruption 
Denies favorable 
trade terms 
Sec. 406, Trade 
Act of 1974 
President President 
Communism Denies Generalized 
System of 
Preferences 
designation 
Sec. 502(b), 
Trade Act of 
1974 
President President 
Terrorism Limits the export of 
goods or services 
Sec. 6(j), 
Export 
Administration 
Act of 1979 
Secretary of 
State 
Secretary of State, 
after the President 
notifies Congress 
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 Rationale Restriction 
Statutory Basis
(Regulation) 
Authority
to Impose
Authority to Lift or 
Wave 
Terrorism, 
proliferation 
Prohibits 
Transactions 
related to defense 
articles and defense 
services 
Sec.40, Arms 
Export Control 
Act 
Secretary 
of State 
Secretary of State, after 
the President notifies 
Congress. President 
may also waive per 
each transaction. 
Terrorism, 
failure to 
cooperate 
with U.S. 
efforts 
Prohibits 
transactions related 
to defense articles 
and defense 
services 
Sec.40A, Arms 
Export Control 
Act 
President President, at annual 
review, or waived by 
the President if he finds 
it “important to the 
national interests of the 
U.S” 
 
Terrorism Prohibits most aid 
under the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 
1961, Agricultural 
Trade 
Development and 
Assistance Act of 
1954, Peace Corps 
Act, and Export-
Import Bank Act of 
1945 
Sec. 620A, 
Foreign 
Assistance Act 
of 1961 
Secretary 
of State 
Secretary of State, after 
the President notifies 
Congress. 
Terrorism Prohibits imports Sec. 505, 
International 
Security and 
Development 
Cooperation 
Act of 1985 
 
President President 
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 Rationale Restriction Statutory Basis
(Regulation) 
Authority 
to Impose 
Authority to Lift or 
Wave 
Terrorism Denies Export-
Import Bank 
financing 
Sec.2(b)(1)(B), 
Export-Import 
Bank Act of 
1945 
President President 
Terrorism Opposes loans of 
funding through 
international 
financial 
institutions 
Sec.1621, 
International 
Financial 
Institutions 
Act 
Secretary 
of the 
treasury 
Secretary of the 
Treasury(no waiver 
authority) 
Terrorism Oppose loans or 
funding through the 
International 
Monetary Fund 
Sec. 6, Bretton 
Woods 
Agreement Act 
Amendments 
of 1978 
Secretary 
of the 
treasury 
Secretary of the 
Treasury(no waiver 
authority) 
Terrorism Prohibits bilateral 
assistance 
Sec. 527, 
Foreign 
Operations, 
Export 
Financing, and 
Related 
Programs 
Appropriations 
Act, 2006 
President President, if he finds it 
in the national security 
interest, or for 
humanitarian reasons 
Terrorism 
(though not 
explicitly 
stated as 
such) 
Prohibits bilateral 
assistance 
Sec. 507, 
Foreign 
Operations, 
Export 
Financing, and 
Related 
Programs 
Appropriations 
Act, 2006 
Statutory 
requireme
nt 
No waiver 
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 Rationale Restriction 
Statutory Basis 
(Regulation) 
Authority 
to Impose 
Authority to 
Lift or Wave 
Terrorism Limits export licensing 
for food and medicine; 
prohibits government 
financing for such 
exports 
Secs.906, 908 
Trade Sanctions 
Reform Act of 
2000 
Statutory 
requirement 
President, 
based on 
national 
security 
interests 
Terrorism Limits provision of 
services to security 
forces, law 
enforcement, military, 
intelligence 
community 
Sec.40, State 
Department 
Basic Authorities 
Act 
Secretary of 
State 
Secretary of 
State 
Terrorism, 
Communism 
Prohibits the 
acquisition of property 
in U.S for diplomatic 
mission 
Sec.205, State 
Department 
Basic Authorities 
Act 
Secretary of 
State 
Secretary of 
State 
Terrorism, 
excessive 
military 
expenditure, 
human rights 
violations 
Prohibits the 
cancellation or 
reduction of certain 
debt 
Sec. 501, 
Miscellaneous 
Appropriations, 
2000 
Statutory 
requirement 
President 
National 
emergency 
Prohibits imports, 
exports, transactions 
related to 
transportation 
Trading With the 
Enemy Act, 
International 
Emergency 
Economic Power 
Act 
President President 
Proliferation 
of weapons 
of mass 
destruction 
Prohibits a range of 
transactions –USG 
contracts, export 
licenses, imports into 
U.S 
 
Sec.73, Arms 
Export Control 
Act 
President President 
59 
 
 Rationale Restriction Statutory Basis 
(Regulation) 
Authority 
to Impose 
Authority to 
Lift or Wave 
Proliferation 
of weapons 
of mass 
destruction: 
nuclear 
enrichment 
transfers 
Prohibits foreign aid, 
military aid 
Secs.101, Arms 
Export Control 
Act 
President President 
Proliferation 
of weapons 
of mass 
destruction: 
nuclear 
reprocessing 
transfers, 
nuclear 
detonations 
Prohibits foreign aid, 
military aid, USG 
defense sales and 
transfers, export 
licenses for USML 
goods and services, 
USG-backed credits, 
support in the IFIs, 
agricultural credits or 
financing, US 
commercial bank 
financing, licenses for 
export of certain goods 
and services 
Sec.102, Arms 
Export Control 
Act 
President President 
Proliferation 
of weapons 
of mass 
destruction: 
nuclear 
detonations 
Prohibits Export-
Import Bank financing
Sec.2(b)(4) of the 
Export-Import 
Bank Act of 
1945 
Statutory 
requirement 
President 
Proliferation 
of weapons 
of mass 
destruction: 
nuclear 
detonations 
Prohibits Export-
Import Bank financing
Foreign 
Operations, 
Export 
Financing, and 
Related 
Programs 
Appropriations 
Act, 2006 
Statutory 
requirement 
No waiver 
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 [Appendix 4] The Potential Contribution of the Japan’s Concessional Development 
Fund to the North Korea Economy 
Areas Forms of Economic Assistance 
Food aid / 
Technical 
support for 
agricultural 
and fishery 
sectors 
Agriculture 
Food aid, fertilizer supply, expansion and 
modernization of fertilizer plants, flood control, 
water conservation for agricultural use, 
mechanization of farming 
Livestock 
Breeding technology, construction of livestock 
food factories 
Fishery 
Restoration and modernization of fishing boats, 
improvement of fishery equipment, 
construction of fishery processing factories 
Normalizatio
n of 
industrial 
production 
Power 
Plants 
Normal 
operation 
Improvement of power transmission and 
distribution facilities 
Expansion 
of power 
capabilities
Construction of small-sized power plants 
Supply of 
industrial 
goods 
Mining 
Modernization of mining equipment, expansion 
of transportation facilities 
Metals / 
Machinery 
Technical assistance 
Chemistry 
Restoration and expansion of petrochemical 
equipment 
Development of the IT industry and 
telecommunication sector 
Support of IT equipment and facilities, 
provision of fiber-optic cable, technology 
assistance for wireless and international 
communication 
Restoration 
of 
infrastructure 
Transporta
-tion and 
communic
-ation 
Railway 
Modernization of railway facilities, 
maintenance of railroad stations, 
computerization of railway system 
Roads Rehabilitation of roads 
Harbor / 
Airport 
Maintenance of harbors, modernization of 
cargo facilities 
Telecom Expansion of cable communication 
Source: Developed from Chan-Woo Lee(2002) 
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